Why Greece is betting on Israel’s Achilles Shield

On Monday, Greece and Israel signed a $3.5bn defence deal to build an integrated, multilayered defence network to protect Greek territory dubbed the Achilles Shield. The package brings together the David’s Sling and Spyder interceptors, the Barak air and missile defence system and multimission radars, alongside a separate deal adding Drone Dome systems to protect strategic sites from UAVs.

It is the largest defence deal ever concluded between the two countries. It is also one of the most significant export agreements in Israel’s recent history.

What makes the agreement particularly striking is that it comes as Israel’s global standing is at one of its lowest points in decades. And Greece is no outlier, given that 65 percent of its citizens now view Israel unfavourably. Why, then, has Athens now chosen to openly deepen its ties with Israel in the most politically sensitive of areas: defence and military technology?

Firstly, the shadow of Israel’s conflict with Iran looms large. In early March, an Iranian drone struck Cyprus, Greece’s neighbour and close partner. This likely reinforced anxieties that were already visible in 2024. After Israel, with the help of the United States, downed approximately 300 Iranian drones and missiles, Greek Defence Minister Nikos Dendias called on Athens to develop its own antidrone “dome”.

The deal is therefore partly the product of pragmatic necessity as countries scramble for military solutions to growing drone threats. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, for example, are acquiring antidrone technology from Ukraine, another country able to market its products as battle-tested.

Despite its political disadvantage, Israel has a practical head start, given that it has long practised “arms diplomacy”, using its defence industry as a springboard to cultivate deeper bilateral ties with prospective buyers.

The second factor driving the Achilles Shield deal is another longstanding tenet of Israeli grand strategy: the “periphery doctrine”. This advocates that Israel develop ties with non-Arab states and peoples on the periphery of the Levant to counter the hostility between Israel and its immediate neighbours. It is a recognition that shared threats can produce strategic partnerships. And in the case of Israel and Greece, that shared threat is Turkiye.

The irony is that Turkiye – as a non-Arab state and the gateway between the Middle East and Europe – was Israel’s close partner in the early days of the periphery doctrine. In 1949, Turkiye was the first Muslim country to recognise Israel. In subsequent years, Ankara and Tel Aviv developed robust but clandestine security ties.