The cost of Iran’s regional leverage

For more than two years, the 2023 Beijing-brokered agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran seemed to mark a shift in Gulf politics: Away from confrontation and towards managed coexistence. The agreement neither ended strategic rivalry nor sought to do so. Its significance was more limited but still consequential: It created political space for competition to be managed without repeatedly spilling into direct regional escalation. That space came under severe strain earlier this year, when direct Iranian attacks on Saudi Arabia led Riyadh to expel Iran’s military attache and four other embassy staff. Renewed Houthi attacks on Saudi territory and the postponement of planned talks in Oman are now placing what remains of that diplomatic framework under further strain. Together, these developments expose a deeper contradiction at the heart of Tehran’s regional strategy: Can Iran sustain stable diplomatic relations with its Arab Gulf neighbours while continuing to draw strategic leverage from a regional network capable of directly threatening their security?

The latest escalation marks an important shift in the trajectory of the conflict in Yemen. Fighting that had largely remained within Yemen’s borders has once again crossed into Saudi territory, drawing the consequences of the war directly into the Gulf security environment. On September 8, the Houthis launched a coordinated wave of drone and ballistic missile attacks against several Saudi cities and strategic sites, including Abha, Khamis Mushait, Jizan and Najran.

The significance of this escalation lies not only in the intensity of the attacks but also in their timing and geographic reach. The strikes coincided with renewed fighting between the Houthis and Yemeni government forces around Bab al-Mandeb, one of the region’s most strategically important maritime chokepoints. By mid-September, the escalation had also produced serious humanitarian consequences, displacing tens of thousands of people within Yemen and pushing others across the Red Sea to Djibouti. The Houthi seizure of Mocha and strategic islands around Bab al-Mandeb further underscored the confrontation’s strategic dimension. The conflict, in other words, is no longer defined solely by control of territory within Yemen. It is increasingly tied to control of strategic geography and to the capacity to project pressure beyond Yemen’s borders.

The timing matters because the escalation is unfolding alongside growing pressure elsewhere in the region. Since Israel and the United States launched their war on Iran in February, Tehran has severely restricted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, sharply increasing the importance of Saudi Arabia’s western export routes through the Red Sea. That shift has, in turn, increased the strategic importance of Bab al-Mandeb as an alternative gateway for energy flows.

These developments connect two maritime theatres that are often analysed separately. Hormuz is the Gulf’s principal eastern gateway; Bab al-Mandeb provides access to the Red Sea from the west. Simultaneous pressure around both creates a broader geography of strategic vulnerability, extending the consequences of confrontation well beyond the immediate battlefield. In that context, the Houthi position along Yemen’s western coast takes on significance beyond the internal dynamics of the Yemeni conflict. It becomes another point through which pressure can be exerted across the wider regional security system.

The central issue, then, is not whether Tehran directly determines every Houthi military decision. More important is whether developments in Yemen advance or complement Iran’s broader strategic objectives. When pressure around Hormuz coincides with instability around Bab al-Mandeb, two distinct maritime arenas can begin to operate as interconnected sources of leverage. The result is more than an expansion of the conflict itself: It is an expansion of the geography through which strategic pressure can be applied.

The postponement of the Oman-hosted talks shows how quickly military escalation can constrict the political space available for diplomacy. Gulf states and Iran had been expected to meet in Salalah to discuss arrangements for managing navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, building on an existing understanding between Tehran and Muscat. The proposed talks were intended to focus on practical maritime security measures, including navigation arrangements and mechanisms for reducing risk around one of the world’s most strategically important waterways.

The regional environment, however, changed faster than the diplomatic process could absorb. Bahrain had already indicated that it would not participate, and Oman subsequently announced the postponement of the meeting, with no new date announced, concluding that the conditions required for productive negotiations were no longer in place. Iran acknowledged that the delay followed concerns raised by some regional states, while reports also pointed to disagreements over elements of the proposed framework.